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Abstract—Remote authentication has been widely studied and
adapted in distributed systems. The security of remote authen-
tication mechanisms mostly relies on one of or the combination
of three factors: something users know – password, something
users have – smart card, and something users are – biometric
characteristics.
This paper introduces an efficient generic framework for three-
factor authentication. The proposed generic framework enhances
the security of existing two-factor authentication schemes by
upgrading them to three-factor authentication schemes, without
exposing user privacy. In addition, we present a case study by
upgrading a secure two-factor authentication scheme to a secure
three-factor authentication scheme. Furthermore, implementa-
tion analysis, formal proof and privacy discussion are provided
to show that the derived scheme is practical, secure and privacy-
preserving.
Index Terms—Authentication, security, privacy, password,
smart card, biometrics.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE need of user authentication is a fundamental securityrequirement in computer society. With wide-spread of
distributed computer networks, remote user authentication has
been introduced to identify a user remotely, and has been
widely studied (e.g. [1], [2], [3]). In general, authentication
services may require three factors, i.e., password, smart card
and biometric characteristics. The authentication based on a
password is called password-based authentication (e.g. Face-
book login system). A system which authenticates users by
using password and smart card is called two-factor authenti-
cation (e.g. HSBC Internet banking login system). In which, a
client can pass authentication only if the client has correct
password and the corresponding authentic smart card. The
biometric-based authentication mainly employs the biometric
characteristics, e.g. fingerprint, palm print, and iris.
The earliest user authentication mechanism through the
Internet is based on password. The concept of password based
authentication was first proposed by Lamport in 1981 [4]. Such
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authentication systems remain the most common mechanism
for internet applications (e.g. email services, conference man-
agement systems, and social networks). However, the security
of such systems is not always reliable. For example, poor
password selections, the password capture Trojans, and the
reuse of passwords could break the security. One popular
attack is called dictionary attack, which targets to find the
correct password by trying a large amount of likely possibili-
ties, such as words in a dictionary or the likely combination of
words. This attack is usually efficient since most users prefer to
choose human memorisable passwords, e.g. the user’s name,
address, or mobile number. A good remedy is additionally
using hardware authentication tokens (usually smart cards)
to authenticate clients. Such a remedy is called two factor
authentication, which has become popular and has been used
by applications with higher security guarantees, e.g. internet
banking services. In 1991, Chang and Wu [5] introduced
this idea of using password and smart card to authenticate
clients. Afterwards, many two-factor authentication schemes
have been proposed. However, the security of two factor
authentication could be compromised since the smart card
may be stolen and the data stored in the smart card can
be duplicated, and the range of possible passwords could
be small and users may forget or lose their passwords. Due
to such concerns, biometric identification was introduced to
authenticate users by using their biometric features.
In 1999, Juels and Watenberg [6] proposed a biomet-
ric authentication scheme, called “fuzzy commitment”, that
improves some aspects of two-factor authentication because
biometric characteristics have higher entropy, and they cannot
be forgotten and are rarely to be lost [7]. However, one
problem is that biometric characteristics are not completely
private since one can “steal” biometric characteristics from
others; e.g., the fingerprint can be obtained from a mug that
the victim has used, and the facial features may be obtained
from a user’s photograph. A way to alleviate these problems
is to combine all these three factors together. This approach
is also known as three-factor authentication, which has been
greatly adapted by cloud-based applications (e.g. [8]).
A. Related work
The introduction of password-based authentication by Lam-
port in 1981 [4] has inspired numerous password based
authentication protocols [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. In 1999,
Yang and Shieh [9] proposed two two-factor authentication
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random nonce. Both of them support contact-less password
changing, i.e., users do not need to contact/inform a server to
change their password. A system satisfying such requirement
can save the computation cost on the server side, and save the
communication cost on both server and user side. Later, Chan
and Cheng [14], and Fan et al. [10] identified impersonation
attacks on the Yang-Schieh scheme. To overcome this flaw,
Shen, Lin and Hwang [11], and Yang, Wang and Chang
[12] suggested improvements on the Yang-Schieh scheme.
However, Yoon et al. [13] showed possible attacks on the
YWC-scheme [12], and introduced an improvement. In 2006,
however, Wang and Bao [15] pointed out that both the SLH-
scheme [11] and Yoon et al.’s scheme [13] are vulnerable to
impersonation attack.
On the other direction, in 2003, Kim et al. [16] proposed
two constructions of three-factor authentication schemes by
using password, smart card, and fingerprints, without requiring
public key directory tables. However, Scott [17] pointed out
that a passive eavesdropper, without accessing to any smart
card, password, or fingerprint, could impersonate any identity
to pass authentication after successfully eavesdropping only
once legitimate log-in.
In 2004, Uludag et al. [18] surveyed various types of
biometric authentication systems, and recommended to use
digital rights management (DRM) systems [19] to address the
problem of biometric authentication systems. In their method,
the cryptographic key is bound with a biometric template and
stored in a database. Thus, the key cannot be revealed without
passing biometric authentication. However, the requirement of
the biometric database has increased the cost and put users’
privacy at risk. To protect users’ privacy, in 2006 Bhargav-
Spantze et al. [20], [21] proposed a novel privacy preserving
two-phase three-factor authentication scheme, based on zero
knowledge proof (ZKP), in which user privacy is preserved by
using the Pedersens commitments [22]. However, the scheme
is expensive because of modular exponentiation operations,
and the requirement that all users’ commitments are stored
on the server side. In 2009, Fan and Lin [23] constructed
an efficiency enhancing and privacy preserving three-factor
authentication scheme, but it does not support contact-less
password changing. There are also many other research [24],
[25] have been done on preserving user privacy in distributed
systems.
Recently, Li and Hwang [26] proposed an efficient three
factor user authentication scheme, without requiring synchro-
nized clocks. Later, Li et al. [27] pointed out that the Li-
Huang scheme does not meet proper authentication since it
is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack. To address this
shortcoming, they provided a further improvement. In 2011,
however, Das et al. [28] found that Li et al.’s improved scheme
neither provided strong authentication nor supported contact-
less password changing. They then proposed an improvement
on Li et al.’s scheme. However, the improved scheme is still
insecure as an adversary who obtained a victim’s smart card
can launch off-line password guessing attack.
To tackle the problem caused by insecure proposals and im-
provements, Huang et al. [29] proposed a generic framework
to upgrade two factor authentication schemes to three-factor
authentication schemes, while preserving security and privacy.
The basic idea is to use a fuzzy extractor to generate the
biometric key from the biometric characteristics, and run twice
the underlying two-factor authentication scheme. The first run
is the normal underlying two-factor scheme using passwords
and smart cards. In the second run of the underlying scheme,
the password is replaced with the generated biometric key.
This framework does not require any change on the underlying
two-factor authentication protocol, and in the derived scheme
users do not need to hand their biometric characteristics over
to the server, so that servers do not need to store any data
related to user’s biometric characteristics. Thus, user privacy
is preserved and the cost on the server side is reduced.
B. Motivation
Huang et al. [29] offer a good framework to produce three-
factor authentication schemes from existing two factor authen-
tication schemes. This framework eases the design of three
factor authentication systems, provides higher security guar-
antee, and preserves user privacy. To generate biometric keys
from the biometric characteristics, Huang et al.’s framework
employs the “fuzzy extractor” [30]. Fuzzy extractor generates
a pair of strings (P;R) from user biometric characteristics,
where P is the auxiliary string and R should be kept secret
as private key. The private R can be recovered if a user
can provide the corresponding auxiliary string P and a close
enough biometric characteristics. The error tolerance in the
scheme depends on three error correcting techniques, namely
Hamming distance, set difference, and edit distance. The fuzzy
extractor provides a good insight into biometric identification
by extracting a unique and random ‘private’ key directly from
the user’s biometric features. However, the fuzzy extractor has
not been widely implemented since the distance measures in
it are less accepted than the Euclidean distance measurement
in biometric applications [31].
Moreover, we observe that the efficiency of Huang et al.’s
framework can be improved from running underlying scheme
twice to running it once – which saves almost half of the
cost in total. Moreover, the study on the concrete three-factor
authentication scheme with formally security analysis, which
is recognised as an open problem and a challenging issue [32],
are missing in their work.
C. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are the improved
generic framework for three-factor authentication and a prov-
ably secure instantiation. The merits of this paper are as
follows.
First, the proposed generic framework enhances efficiency
by combining the user’s password and the user’s biometric
key together and using the hash value of this combination as
the user’s secret key. Consequently, the resulted three-factor
scheme only needs to run the underlying two-factor scheme
one time. This saves almost half of the communication cost
and computation cost for each login among potential billions
of users.
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We employ the improved finger print-based “fuzzy vault”
[33] to identify the user’s biometric features. Literature shows
that the fuzzy extractor has not been implemented yet, while
researchers implemented and improved the fuzzy vault scheme
in recent years [34], [35], [33], [36], [31]. Moreover, the fuzzy
vault has been widely accepted because the Euclidean distance
measurement which is used in the fuzzy vault are widely
accepted by majority of biometric applications [31]. Therefore,
the improved framework selects the fuzzy vault to employ the
third factor, biometric features.
Last, a provably secure instantiation is presented. In par-
ticular, this paper discusses the practicability analysis of the
concrete scheme, compares our concrete scheme with other
existing three-factor schemes, provides privacy discussion, and
shows formal security proof on the concrete scheme.
D. Organization
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II
reviews and discusses two well-known biometric identification
mechanisms. Section III reviews Huang et al.’s framework
and provides an improved generic framework for three-factor
authentication. The instantiation with analysis and comparison
are given in Section IV. In section V, formal security proof
and privacy discussion for this instantiation are provided.
II. BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION MECHANISMS
In 1999, Juels and Wattenberg [6] proposed “fuzzy commit-
ment”, the first biometric identification scheme, which deploys
Hamming distance to tolerate errors. Later, Juels and Sudan
[37] introduced a provably secure biometric identification
scheme, called fuzzy vault, in which a user can generate a
long-bit secret key, and encrypt it by using his/her extracted
biometric template. The long-bit secret key can be recovered
by providing the encrypted data and the corresponding au-
thentic biometric characteristics. In 2003, Clancy et al. [34]
proposed a secure smart card based fingerprint authentication
scheme by using Juels and Sudan’s fuzzy vault. Later, in 2007,
Nandakumar et al. [35] proposed a fully automatic implemen-
tation by employing the fuzzy vault and using helper data to
align unidentified fingerprints accurately. Their scheme used
both location (x; y) and orientation attribute  of a minutia
point to record the biometric data, where (x; y) is the row and
column indicators in the image as the location, and  is the
orientation on the X-axis. The helper data is high curvature
points extracted from the fingerprint orientation field, thus it
neither affects the security nor leaks any information about
the biometric template. One year later, Nagar, Nandakumar
and Jain [33] improved the security and matching accuracy of
Nandakumar et al’s fingerprint-based fuzzy vault scheme by
employing additional minutiae descriptors [38], which capture
local ridge orientation and ridge frequency information in the
neighbourhood of a minutia. The results in [33] show that the
improved scheme reduces the false acceptance rate (FAR) and
significantly increases the vault security.
On the other direction, in 2004, Dodis et al. [30] proposed
fuzzy extractor, which has two procedures: a generation pro-
cedure and a reproduction procedure. After a user scanned his
biometric features and obtained the biometric template w, the
generation procedure extracts a random R and a corresponding
auxiliary P from w. In the authentication phase, the inputs of
reproduction procedure are P and an unidentified biometric
template w0; the output of this reproduction procedure is
exactly the same R if and only if the difference between
w and w0 is within an acceptable error tolerance. In 2008,
Teoh and Ong [39] proposed a randomised dynamic quan-
tisation transformation (RDQT), which is based on fuzzy
commitment, to binarize biometric data, and satisfy both
randomness and uniqueness. Meanwhile, Sheng et al. [40]
presented a template-free biometric-key generation, which can
also generate a key directly from a biometric template.
A. Fuzzy vault
Fuzzy vault is a cryptographic construction for data pro-
tection and user authentication, whose security relies on un-
exposed biometric characteristics and smart card. The error
tolerance in fuzzy vault is achieved by using the Euclidean
distance measurement which has been widely accepted by the
majority of biometric applications. The operations of the fuzzy
vault are described as follows.
First, a user extracts biometric template X by scanning her
biometric characteristics (e.g. fingerprint). Then, she encodes
a pre-self-generated secret string K into a self-selected poly-
nomial Pol, and evaluates the polynomial on all elements in
X . She also needs to choose a large number of random points
which do not lie on Pol as the noise. The final vault V is the
collection of the points which lie on Pol and the noise points
which do not lie on Pol.
She can recover the secret string K from vault V by
providing a biometric template X 0 such that the difference
between X and X 0 satisfies jX  X 0j < , where X  X 0 =
fxjx 2 X;x =2 X 0g, and  is an integer which is the fuzziness
parameter. This is because that the polynomial Pol can be
reconstructed if a sufficient number of points on Pol can be
identified. Thus, K can be successfully recovered from Pol.
The detail operation is defined as follows:
Lock:
1) X    !
K;Pol
Gen() ! L
Taking input a user’s biometric template X , secret K
and polynomial Pol, Gen() outputs a set L of points
which lie on the Pol.
2) CP  !
L
Enc() ! V
Taking input L and a set CP of “chaff points” (i.e.
random noise points) which do not lie on Pol, Enc()
outputs a vault V such that V = CP [ L. CP is
generated on the user side, and if we denote r the
number of points in L, and s the number of points in
CP , then we require s >> r.
Unlock:
1) X
0
 !
V
Dec() ! Pol
Taking input V and biometric template X 0, Dec()
outputs Pol if and only if jX   X 0j < , where
X   X 0 = fxjx 2 X;x =2 X 0g and  is the fuzziness
parameter.
42) Pol  ! Rec() ! K
Taking input Pol, Rec() outputs the secret key K.
Remark 1: The security of the fuzzy vault is based on the
difficulty of distinguishing genuine points from chaff points in
vault V , and the difficulty to reconstruct the polynomial Pol
in vault V . So, the security guarantee is in proportion to the
number of added chaff points.
III. A GENERIC THREE-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION
FRAMEWORK
A. Review of Huang et al.’s framework
Huang et al.’s framework employs the fuzzy extractor to
generate a uniquely long-bit random string as the biometric
key for users. By running the underlying two-factor scheme
twice, a three-factor scheme is constructed. In particular, the
first run uses password and smart card as normal two factor
authentication system. In the second run, framework replaces
the password by a biometric key and runs the underlying
protocol again, thus a three-factor authentication is obtained.
Huang et al.’s framework consists of three phases:
Registration:
The processes of registration includes the following steps:
1) User Ui chooses initial password PW1 and extracts bio-
metric template X by scanning her biometric features;
2) Ui generates a pair (R;P ) by providing X to the fuzzy
extractor;
3) Let the second password PW2 be h(R), where h() is
a cryptographic hash function;
4) Ui [PW1]
2 Factor Reg(=========) S [SK1]! Data1;
Ui runs the underlying two-factor registration protocol
(2-Factor-Reg) with initial password PW1, and server S
uses secret key SK1 to generate Data1;
5) Ui [PW2]
2 Factor Reg(=========) S [SK2]! Data2.
Ui runs the registration protocol again with PW2, and
S issues Data2 by using another secret SK2;
6) Ui obtains a smart card SC which stores Data1, Data2,
and Data3 = (P; h(); Rep()), where h() and Rep()
are the corresponding hash function and the reproduction
procedure, respectively.
The scheme supposes that PW1; PW2 will be deleted
immediately from the server side upon completion of the
corresponding registration steps. This means that in the regis-
tration phase, the server is fully trusted.
Authentication:
User U 0i first inserts SC into a card reader, enters her pass-
word, and scans her biometric features. We use X 0 to denote
the extracted biometric template. The authentication phase is
as follows.
1) The smart card recovers R0 through Rep(), and calcu-
lates PW 02 = h(R
0). R0 = R if and only if jX X 0j < 
for some fuzziness parameter ;
2) U 0i [PW
0
1; Data1]
2 Factor Auth(=========) S [SK1];
U 0i with (PW
0
1; Data1) runs the authentication phase (2-
Factor-Auth) of the underlying two-factor authentication
protocol with server S;
3) U 0i [PW
0
2; Data2]
2 Factor Auth(=========) S [SK2];
U 0i with PW
0
2, Data2 runs the 2-Factor-Auth with S.
The user successfully passes user authentication if and only if
both step 2 and step 3 succeeded.
Password Changing:
The password can be changed by running password changing
protocol (2-Factor-Password-Changing) in the underlying two-
factor scheme after successfully logging and updating the SC
accordingly. The biometrics can be changed by running step
2 and step 3 in the registration phase, then the user and
server execute 2-Factor-Password-Changing and update the
corresponding data in SC.
B. Improved framework
We assume that the server in the registration phase is trusted.
The details are specified as follows:
Three-Factor-Registration: The processes of registration
include the following steps:
1) User Ui chooses an initial password PW1, a long-bit
secret key PW2.
2) The fuzzy vault device extracts biometric template X
by scanning her biometric features.
3) Taking X , PW2, and polynomial Pol as inputs, Gen()
outputs a set L, and by taking the set CP of noise chaff
points and L, the Ence() outputs the encrypted data V .
4) Ui [PW ]
2 factor Reg(========) S [SK]! Data1, where
PW=h(PW1jjPW2) and jj is concatenation operation.
The user with PW and the server with SK run the
registration phase of the underlying protocol.
5) Server stores Data1 and Data2 =
(V;Rec(); Dec(); h()) in smart card SC, and
gives it to Ui.
Three-Factor-Authentication:
To access services, user U 0i inserts SC to a card reader,
which can extracts the data from the SC. Then, U 0i inputs
PW 01 and scans her biometric features, the extracted biometric
template is X 0. The details are as follows:
1) The card reader extracts X 0 from U 0i ’s biometric fea-
tures, and reproduces PW 02 such that PW
0
2 = PW2 if
and only if jX  X 0j < ;
2) The smart card calculates PW 0=h(PW 01jjPW 02);
3) U 0i [PW
0; Data1]
2 factor Auth(=========) S [SK];
The user can successfully pass authentication if and only
if this step is success.
Three-Factor-Password-Changing:
The PW1 can be changed by following steps.
1) After passing authentication, U 0i sends the password
changing request, inputs new password PW 001 , and scans
the biometric template.
2) The ‘fuzzy vault’ device will recover the PW2 by using
the ‘fuzzy vault’ decoding scheme.
3) The smart card calculates PW 00 = h(PW 001 jjPW2).
4) PW 00 is taken as the password and runs the password
changing phase of the underlying protocol.
Biometric key PW2 can be changed in a similar way.
For this purpose, U 0i chooses a new biometric key as PW
00
2 ,
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replaces current V in SC. The SC calculates PW 00 =
h(PW1jjPW 002 ), then takes PW 00 as the password and runs
the password changing phase of the underlying protocol.
IV. INSTANTIATION
Our instantiation will use the Yang et al.’s two-factor
authentication scheme [41], which is provably secure, as the
underlying scheme.
Let G be a group of prime order q and g a generator,
H : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gk denote a collision resistant hash
function, H 0 : f0; 1g ! f0; 1gk a hash function which
preserves the entropy of its input (e.g. add paddings after the
input); PRFK : f0; 1gk ! f0; 1gk a pseudo-random function
keyed by K. In addition, we assume that a server S has a
long term secret x such that x 2 f0; 1gk, and encryption and
signature key pairs (PK;SK) and (PK 0; SK 0), respectively.
Let EPK(M) denotes the asymmetric key encryption on
message M under public key PK; SigSK0(M) a signature
on M issued by using signing key SK 0.
A. Review of Yang et al.’s scheme
In the registration phase, a user Ui chooses a unique identity
IDi and sends it to the server S. After receiving the request,
S issues a credential Ci = PRFx(H(IDi)), and hides it by
calculating B = Ci  H 0(PW0), where PW0 is the initial
password chosen by S; then S sends the initial password PW0
and a smart card which contains (PK;PK 0; IDi; B; p; g; q)
to Ui.
The login phase is presented in the Fig. 1. To log in, Ui
attaches her smart card to a card reader device, and enters her
password PW 0. The smart card calculates C 0i = BH 0(PW 0)
and sends (IDi; sid; ga) to S, where sid is the session
identifier, and a is a new selected random number. S should
send (SID; IDi; sid; gb; SigSK0(SID; IDi; sid; ga; gb)) to
Ui, where SID is the identity of S and the signa-
ture is used for server side authentication. If the sig-
nature is valid, then Ui believes that he is talking to
the real server, and sends (IDi; sid; CT ) to S, where
CT=EPK(C 0i; IDi; SID; sid; g
a; gb)). S accepts Ui as a gen-
uine user if C 0i = PRFx(H
0(IDi)). Now both parties believe
that they have shared the same session key gab.
.Ui S
(IDi; sid; g
a)
 = SigSK0(SID; IDi; sid; g
a; gb)
(SID; IDi; sid; g
b; )
Verify signature
Verify ga and gb
CT = EPK(C
0
i; IDi; SID; sid; g
a; gb)
(IDi; sid; CT )
Fig. 1. Login phase of Yang et al.’s scheme
In addition, Ui can change her password at anytime after she
receiving the smart card and initial password PW0 from S.
To change the password, she picks a new password PWnew,
and performs Bnew = B  H 0(PW0)  H 0(PWnew), then
replaces B with Bnew.
B. Protocol
The basic idea of our concrete protocol is that using PW =
H 0(PW1jjPW2) as the password in Yang et al’s scheme,
where PW1 is the real password, and PW2 is the biometric
key encrypted through fuzzy vault scheme. A user can pass
authentication only if s/he provides the correct password, smart
card, and the biometric features which is close enough with
the one used in the registration phase.
Registration
In the registration phase, a user Ui performs exactly the
same as in Yang et al.’s scheme. However, after Ui receiving
the smart card and the initial password PW0, she needs
to additionally selects a new password PW1, a polynomial
Pol and a biometric key PW2. In addition, she extracts her
biometric template X , encrypts PW2 through fuzzy vault
device which outputs a vault V . Then Ui writes V into
the smart card, and calculates PW = H 0(PW1jjPW2), and
updates B by computing B = Ci  H 0(PW0)  PW . The
‘fuzzy vault’ procedures are reviewed in the Section II-A, thus
we omit the detail here.
Login-and-Authentication Phase
User U 0i attaches her smart card to a card reader device,
inputs password PW 01 and scans her biometric features. The
fuzzy vault device extracts the biometric template X 0, then the
fuzzy vault device calculates Pol0 = Dec(X 0; V ), and PW 02 =
Rec(Pol0). The smart card SC calculates C 0i=BPW 0, where
PW 0 = H 0(PW 01jjPW 02). Then, the protocol runs the login
phase as the same as Yang et al’s scheme by using PW 0.
Password-Changing
To change an old password PW1, Ui performs the following
steps.
1) Chooses a new password PW 01.
2) Calculates PWnew = H 0(PW 01jjPW2) and com-
putes Bnew = B  PW  PWnew, where PW =
H 0(PW1jjPW2).
3) Replace B with Bnew in the smart card.
The biometric key PW2 and the biometric features can be
changed in a similar way, in which case, the vault V in the
smart card should also be updated.
C. Analysis of implementation
To analyze the derived three-factor authentication scheme,
we take the fingerprint based fuzzy vault scheme [35] proposed
by Nandakumar, Jain, and Pankanti in 2007, though any secure
biometrics authentication protocol can be used. In their fuzzy
vault scheme, each element vi 2 V (i 2 f1; 2; : : : ; r + sg) is
represented as three-tuple such that vi = (x; y; ), where r is
the number of points in L (w.r.t. the points in V which lie on
P ) and s denotes the number of noise points in V which do
not lie on P , (x; y) is the row and column coordinates in the
6image showing the location,  is the orientation which respect
to the X-axis.
In addition, we take s  10r to satisfy the requirement
that s >> r. Moreover, 8-degree polynomial is used to
encrypt 128-bit secrets, and the lengths of x; y;  (quantized
and represented in bit strings) are 6; 5; 5, respectively. As the
parameter showed in [35], there are around 30 points which lie
on the selected polynomial in a 640480 at 500 dpi resolution
fingerprint image, so we could conclude r = 30 and s = 300.
Thus, V contains 330 points which requires 660 Bytes space.
Furthermore, the length of help data used in this fuzzy vault
scheme is depended on the points of maximum curvature in the
flow curves, and it can be ignored. Thus, only less than 1 KB
additional data are required if compared with the underlying
two factor authentication scheme.
The genuine acceptance rate (GAR) and false acceptance
rate (FAR) are influenced by the degree of polynomial. In the
above setting, the FAR falls in 0:01%   0:04% and GAR is
grater than 90%. In fact, GAR is acceptable even if GAR =
50%, as this means that genuine users can pass authentication
by scanning their fingerprint about twice.
We compare our instantiation with other schemes into two
tables, namely Table I and Table II. The focus of the first table
is on the efficiency, and the second table is mainly focusing on
the security and privacy. In Table I, Reg-Cost and Auth-Cost
present the computational cost in the registration phase and
authentication phase, respectively; the number indicates that
how many times the corresponding operation is required by the
protocol, e.g. 2 EXP means that exponentiation computation
is required twice.
These two tables show that Li-Hwang scheme [26], Li
et al.’s scheme [27], Das’s scheme [28], and Kim-Lee-Yoo
scheme [16] support contactless password changing, and the
first three schemes only have very small computation cost.
However, all of them have security flaws. In contrast, both
Bhargav-Spantze et al.’s scheme [21] and Fan-Lin scheme [23]
are secure under the three-factor adversary model, but they
do not support contactless password changing and Bhargav-
Spantze et al.’s scheme does not support session key establish-
ment, so perfect forward secret cannot been guaranteed. While
the derived protocol protects user privacy, offers contactless
password changing, and supports session key establishment,
with acceptable computation cost.
V. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
The hypothesis of the security of our proposed generic
framework is that (A) the underlying two-factor authentication
protocol is secure when any one factor is compromised, and
(B) the fuzzy vault system is secure when the biometric
template is kept secret. In a system derived by using our
framework, the authentication process is actually the same as
the underlying two-factor authentication protocol. However,
the difference is that, the “password” PW = h(PW1jjPW2)
is the output of a hash function, where the input data are the
human memorisable password PW1, and the secret bitstring
PW2 which is protected by using the fuzzy vault system.
1This guarantees that the server does not store users’ password and biodata.
Considering three different cases: the PW1 and the biomet-
ric template are exposed to the attacker, the PW1 and the smart
card are exposed to the attacker, and the biometric template
and the smart card are exposed to the attacker.
To make the analysis easier to be understood, we assume a
very strong attacker, who can recover PW2 if the biometric
template is compromised, though actually the attacker also
needs the information stored in the smart card. However, this
assumption will not affect our security since if the system is
secure against a very strong attacker, then the system is also
secure against a weak attacker.
Loosely speaking, if the PW1 and biometric template (so
the PW2) are compromised, then it is the similar case as that
in the underlying two-factor authentication protocol, the pass-
word is corrupted while the smart card remains secure (since
PW can be computed in this case). So the derived system
will remain secure. Otherwise, we can build a probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) Turing machine to break the security
of the underlying two-factor authentication protocol, which
contradicts to the hypothesis (A).
If the case that PW1 and the smart card are compromised,
we have that PW2 is secure thanks to the hypothesis (B). In
addition, by hypothesis (A), we have that the system is secure
if PW remains secure. So, the only way the attacker can pass
the authentication is to discover the value of PW . If there is a
way to discover the value of PW with overwhelming proba-
bility, then we can either construct a PPT Turing machine that
is able to discover the value of the password in the underlying
two-factor authentication protocol, which is a contradiction
of hypothesis (A); or we can find the hash collision which
contradicts to the assumption of a secure hash function. The
case that the biometric template and smart card are composed
is similar to this case. Now, we present the formal security
analysis of the instantiation given in Section IV.
Considering two communicating parties A and B, a mutual
authentication protocol is secure if and only if participant A
accepting participant B implies B accepting A. The generic
security model of mutual authentication have been well studied
[42], [43], [44]; however, more strict security model is desired
for the three-factor authentication systems due to the more in-
tricate authentication conditions. Currently, the formal security
analysis of multiple factor authentication scheme remains as a
challenging issue [32], although there are some existing works
[45], [23], [46].
This section proposes a security model for three-factor au-
thenticated key exchange schemes by extending and adopting
the existing generic model [42]. Based on the proposed model,
we prove the security of the derived scheme.
A. Security model
We place probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A
between user Ui in user set U and sever Sj in server set S. LetQsid
U;S be the user oracle interacting with the server in session
sid; and
Qsid
S;U denotes the server oracle interacting with user
in the session sid. It is obvious that if protocol
Q
is secure
when A knows two out of three factors, then
Q
is still secure
when only one factor has been leaked to A. Therefore, we
7TABLE I
COMPARISON OF SCHEMES (A)
`````````Efficiency
Scheme Li-Hwang
scheme [26]
Li et al.’s
scheme [27]
Das’s
scheme [28]
Kim-Lee-Yoo
scheme [16]
Bhargav-Spantze
et al.’s scheme [21], [20]
Fan-Lin
scheme [23]
Proposed
scheme
No server storage1
p p p p   p
Reg-Cost
Server Very Low Very Low Very Low 2 EXP 1 EXP Low Low
Client Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low 2 EXP Low Very low
Auth-Cost
Server Very Low Very Low Very Low 2 EXP 3 EXP 1 PKD 1 SigSign, 2 EXP, 1 PKD
Client Very Low Very Low Very Low 2 EXP 2 EXP PKE 1 SigVer, 2 EXP, 1 PKE
Very Low The most expensive operation is hash function.
Low The most expensive operation is symmetric key encryption/decryption.
EXP: Large exponentiation computation is required.
PKE (or PKD): Asymmetric key encryption (or decryption) is required.
SigSign (or SigVery): Digital signature signing (or verification) is required.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF SCHEMES (B)
hhhhhhhhhhhScheme
Property Contactlesspassword
changing
Biometrics
privacy
Session key
establishment
supportance
Security
Li-Hwang scheme [26]
p   Vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack
Li et al.’s scheme [27]
p  p Fail to provide strong authentication
Das’s scheme [28]
p  p Vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack
Kim-Lee-Yoo scheme [16]
p p  Vulnerable to impersonation attack
Bhargav-Spantze
et al.’s scheme [21], [20] 
p  Secure under three-factor requirements
Fan-Lin scheme [23]  p p Secure under three-factor requirements
Proposed scheme
p p p
Secure under three-factor requirements
only consider the case of two corrupted factors. A can make
following oracle queries.
1) Register(
Q
; Sj): Upon receiving this query from A,
the server oracle acts as Sj to run the registration phase
with A, and issues identity IDi and sends smart card
SC to A.
2) Execute(Ui; Sj ; sid): This oracle query models all
passive attackers who can eavesdrop on all messages
transmitted between U and S in session sid in
Q
.
Upon receiving this query,
Qsid
U;S and
Qsid
S;U will execute
protocol as Ui and Sj in
Q
, respectively. The messages
exchanged between them will be recorded and sent to
A.
3) Send(Ui; Sj ; sid;Mm;m): This query sends message
Mm with sequence of message flow m to server oracleQsid
S;U which simulates Sj , and then, the oracle will com-
pute a response honestly in
Q
, and send the response
to A.
4) Send(Sj ; Ui; sid;Mm0 ;m0): This query sends message
Mm0 with a sequence of message flow m0 to user oracleQsid
U;S which simulates Ui, and then, the user oracle
will compute a response honestly in
Q
, and send the
response to A. Upon receiving the query with m0 = ,
where  is an empty set, from A, the user oracle will
start a new session and send a service request message
to A.
5) Reveal(
Q
; Ui; Sj ; sid): This query models the leakage
of a session key in session sid between user Ui and
server Sj . This query can only be made when a session
key has been shared between the server and the user in
session sid. Upon receiving this query, the user oracle
will send the shared session key to A.
6) There are three corruption queries:
a) Corrupt(Ui; pw; SC). Upon receiving this query,
user oracle will output the user Ui’s password pw
and the data stored in the smart card SC;
b) Corrupt(Ui; pw;Bio). Upon receiving this query,
user oracle will output the user Ui’s password pw
and the biometric template Bio;
c) Corrupt(Ui; SC;Bio). Upon receiving this query,
user oracle will output the user Ui’s biometric
template Bio and the data stored in the smart card
SC;
Note that A can only make one corruption query on the
same target.
7) Test(Ui; Sj ; sid): This query can be made by A only
after a session key has been shared between Ui and Sj
in a fresh session sid. If so, then a coin b is tossed,
if it lands b = 0, then this oracle outputs the session
key. Otherwise, a fixed-length random string is returned.
8A needs to output b0 = 0 or b0 = 1 as the result of
distinguishing the session key from the random string.
A can only ask this query once.
The definitions of matching conversations, secure mutual
authentication and secure key exchange [42] are reviewed as
follows.
Definition 1: (Matching Conversations): Considering fix
number of moves R = 2 1 and R-move protocolQ. RunQ
in the presence of adversary A and consider two oracles
Qsid
U;S
and
Qsid
S;U that engage in conversationsK andK
0, respectively.
(; ; ) denotes that A obtains response  by sending  to
an oracle at time  . 1 =  indicates the start point of a
new session in protocol
Q
. “” denotes the final decision of
R-move protocol
Q
.
1) We say that K 0 is a matching conversation to K if
there exist 0 < 1 < : : : < R and 1; 1; : : : ; ; 
such that K is prefixed by (0; ; 1), (2; 1; 2),
. . . , (2 4;  2;  1), (2 2;  1; ) and K 0 is
(1; 1; 1), (3; 2; 2), . . . , (2 3;  1;  1).
2) We say that K is a matching conversation to
K 0 if there exist 0 < 1 < : : : < R
and 1; 1; : : : ; ;  such that K 0 is prefixed
by (1; 1; 1), (3; 2; 2), . . . , (2 3;  1;  1),
(2 1; ; ) and K is (0; ; 1), (2; 1; 2) ,. . . ,
(2 4;  2;  1), (2 2;  1; ).
Let
Qsid
Ui;Sj
(resp.
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
) be the oracle which acts as
user Ui (resp. server Sj) communicating with server Sj
(resp. user Ui). Let No   MatchingA;Ui(k) (resp. No  
MatchingA;Sj (k)) be the event that there exist Ui; Sj and
sid such that
Qsid
Ui;Sj
(resp.
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
) has accepted A as
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
(resp.
Qsid
Ui;Sj
), while
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
(resp.
Qsid
Ui;Sj
) has not engaged
in a matching conversation. In other words, it is the event that
user Ui (resp. server Sj) believes that server Sj (resp. user
Ui) is communicating with him, but in fact, it is the adversary
A who has impersonated server Sj (resp. user Ui).
Remark 2: The above definition is defined for the case of
R = 2   1. The case of R = 2 is similar and we omit it
here.
Definition 2: (Secure Three-Factor Mutual Authentication
(STMA)) We say that
Q
is a secure mutual authentication
protocol if the following properties are satisfied in presence
of PPT adversary A defined in the adversary model.
1) If oracle
Qsid
Ui;Sj
and
Qi
Sj ;Ui
have matched conversa-
tions, then they accept each other.
2)
Qsid
Ui;Sj
accepted implies a matching conversation: the
probability of No   MatchingA;Ui(k) is negligible,
where Sj should not be registered by A. (Secure server
authentication)
3)
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
accepted implies a matching conversation: the
probability of No   MatchingA;Sj (k) is negligible,
where Ui should not be registered by A. (Secure user
authentication)
Definition 3: (Secure Three-Factor Authenticated Key Ex-
change (STAKE)) A Protocol
Q
is called STAKE if the
following properties hold in presence of PPT adversary A
defined in the adversary model:

Q
is an STMA protocol;
 if the session is fresh in protocol
Q
, and both
Qsid
Ui;Sj
and
Qi
Sj ;Ui
complete matching conversations, then they
have shared the same session key;
 the advantage AdvA(k) is negligible.
Note that:
 A session is called fresh if both
Qsid
Ui;Sj
and
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
accepted each other and no session key reveal query has
been made to
Qsid
Ui;Sj
or
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
.
 AdvA(k)=jPr[GguessA(k)]   1
2
j, where the
Pr[GguessA(k)] is the probability such that A has
won in the Test(Ui; Sj ; sid).
B. Formal security analysis
To prove the security of our concrete scheme, we shall show
that if A can successfully pass user or server authentication
with a non-negligible probability, then we can construct a PPT
Turing machine T to solve the underlying hard problem under
the help of A with a non-negligible probability. The concrete
protocol is reviewed as follows:
1) Ui ! S: M1=(IDi; sid; ga)
2) S ! Ui: M2=(SID, sid, gb, SigSK0(SID, IDi, sid,
ga, gb))
3) Ui ! S: M3=(IDi; sid; CT ), where CT=EPK (C 0i,
IDi, SID; sid; ga; gb)
4) S checks credential C 0i. Ui will pass user authentication
if and only if C 0i=PRFx(H(IDi)).
Now, the shared session key is gab.
Lemma 1: (Secure User Authentication) In the proposed
protocol
Q
, if the pseudo-random function (PRF) is replaced
by an ideal random function, the public key encryption scheme
is secure against CCA2 attack, and
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
has accepted, then
the probability of No MatchingA;Sj (k) is negligible even
in presence of PPT adversary A in the adversary model.
Proof: This can be proved by contradiction. If there exists
an adversary A who can pass user authentication with non-
negligible probability , then we can construct a PPT Turing
machine T to solve the underlying hard problem without
knowing secret key x, i.e. winning the game of PRF (Game-
PRF), with a non-negligible probability by using A.
Let’s assume that PRF is an ideal random function. The
Game-PRF is defined as follows: there are two participants, a
challenger and a PRF oracle
Q
PRF which has the secret x.
The challenger has the power to ask
Q
PRF for the PRFx(M)
of any message M as many times as she wants. The game
is that this challenger sends two different plaintexts P0 and
P1 to the PRF oracle, which will output PRFx(Pb) to the
challenger, where P0 and P1 have not been asked by the
challenger, and b is either 0 or 1 according to the result of
coin tossing. After that, the challenger needs to output b0 = 0
or b0 = 1 as her guess of value b. If b0 = b, then the
challenger won the game. Let Pradv[PRF ] = Prwin 1
2
be
the advantage of correct guessing of b, where Prwin denotes
the probability of the event that this challenger won the game.
The basic idea is that to win Game-PRF, T simulates an
environment of our concrete protocol to convince adversary
9A that this simulation is the real environment of concrete
protocol execution. On the other side, A should only has a
negligible probability to know the truth, i.e. this is not a real
protocol environment but a simulation. In such a simulation, T
communicates with A who has the ability to break our concrete
protocol in some way in a session with session ID sid with a
non-negligible probability. Then, in order to win Game-PRF,
T will make use of A’s ability to make the decision of which
input message has been used to generate the output PRFx(Pb)
with a non-negligible probability.
The simulation is constructed as follows. In the simulation,
T answers all oracle queries made by A. To achieve this
goal, T needs to setup (SK;PK) for the public key scheme
and (SK 0; PK 0) for the signature scheme, while T does
not know the value of long term secret key x which is forQ
PRF .
Qsid
Ui;Sj
denotes the user oracle which has password
PW1, smart-card SC, and corresponding biometric template
X which can recover biometric key PW2 with the SC.
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
denotes the server oracle which has PRF oracle
Q
PRF . In
our concrete protocol, A can make the following queries:
 Register(
Q
; Sj): Upon receiving this query from A,
T runs the registration phase with A with the help ofQ
PRF .
 Execute(Ui; Sj ; sid): In
Q
,
Qsid
Ui;Sj
and
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
generate
and record all messages transmitted between Ui and Sj
in session sid, then send these messages to A.
 Send(Ui; Sj ; sid;Mm;m): A can send M1 to T , then T
responds to M2 by using SK 0 to sign a signature as the
protocol specified. Upon receiving M3 from A, T sends
the result of user authentication according to M1 and M3
by using SK to decrypt the ciphertext and asking
Q
PRF
in order to verify the credential.
 Send(Sj ; Ui; sid;Mm0 ;m0): Upon receiving a new ses-
sion query Send(Sj ,Ui,sid, M,), T asks
Qsid
Ui;Sj
to
send first message M1 to A. After receiving correspond-
ing message M2, T checks the signature by using PK 0.
If the signature is valid, T asks
Q
PRF and encrypts its
output to form message M3.
 Corrupt(Ui; factora; factorb): Upon receiving this
query,
Qsid
Ui;Sj
will send the corresponding two factors
according to a and b, where a; b 2 fpw; SC;Biog and
a 6= b.
If A can pass user authentication successfully with a
non-negligible probability without asking
Qsid
Ui;Sj
, there must
exist a matching conversation between A and T who sim-
ulates server Sj if the following happens. First, A asks
Corrupt(Ui,factora, factorb) to obtain two factors, then
sends the first message to T who then responds with the second
message. Finally, A forms the third message to T .
Now, we show how T makes use of A to win Game-PRF
with non-negligible advantage as follows. We assume that A
attacks at least once among qs sessions, while T does not
know which session A is going to attack. Now, T chooses a
session out of qs sessions randomly. Then, the probability of
A passing user authentication in this session is
1
qs
 .
To avoid the case that A found that this environment is
only a simulation, in the rest qs   1 sessions, T redirects the
identity IDr, which is included in the first message, to oracleQ
PRF which will respond PRFx(IDr) back to T . Then, T
records this identity into the compromised table and checks
whether A has passed the user authentication by matching
PRFx(IDr) with the credential which is encrypted in the
third message. If they are matched, then T responds to A that
T accepts A’s login request. Otherwise, T rejects A’s request.
For these sessions, T just randomly guesses the value of b, so
the probability that T wins the game is
1
2
.
To use A, after receiving first message M1 =
(IDnew; sid; g
a), T forms M2 = (SID; sid; gb;
SigSK0(SID; IDnew; sid; g
a; gb)) by using SK 0 and sends
it to A. If A can successfully pass user authentication, s/he
must be able to forge third message M3 = (IDnew; sid; CT ),
where CT = EPK(C 0new; IDnew; SID; sid; g
a; gb). Now,
T requires to start the Game-PRF by choosing two distinct
messages y0 = H(IDnew) and y1 = R1, and sends (y0; y1)
to the PRF test query. The query responds PRFx(yb) to T ,
then T decrypts CT to recover C 0new and checks whether the
response is the same as C 0new. If it is, then it outputs b
0 = 0
as the guessed result of b. Otherwise, it outputs b0 = 1.
We now analyze the probability of game winning. We
assume that A forges user Unew, and passes user authentication
successfully in polynomial time  , with non-negligible
probability , after asking qR times Register(
Q
; Sj), qE
times Execute(Ui; Sj ; sid), qS times send query in qs
sessions. The formula of calculating probability Pradv[PRF ]
of three different corrupting cases should be the same but
with different  because we do not care how A can pass the
user authentication. If A does not select this special session,
the probability of game wining without the help of A is
1
2
.
Otherwise, if A indeed attacks this special session chose by T ,
then the probability is concerned as follows. The probability
of A pass authentication is , so the probability that we win
the Game-PRF is ( 1+(1  )  1
2
). Because if A has passed
authentication, then we have 100% probability to win the
game. However, A may fail with the probability of (1   ),
in this case, we have
1
2
probability to win the game. Thus,
Pradv[PRF ]
=
1
qs
 (  1 + (1  )  1
2
) +
qsqs   1
qs
 1
2
  1
2
=
+ qs
2qs
  1
2
=

2qs
It is clear that Pradv[PRF ] is non-negligible since  is non-
negligible, and T spends  0 = +2 time to win games, where
2 is the executing time of T interaction with the test query. It
is obvious that both  and  02 are polynomial times, thus, 
0 is
also a polynomial time. Therefore, T can win Game-PRF with
non-negligible advantage Pradv[PRF ], and this contradicts
assumption.
Lemma 2: (Secure Server Authentication) In proposed
protocol
Q
, if the signature scheme is unforgeable against
adaptive chosen message attack, and
Qsid
Ui;Sj
has accepted,
then for any PPT adversary A in the adversary model, the
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probability of No MatchingA;Ui(k) is negligible.
Proof: This can be proved by contradiction as well. If A
has been accepted by
Qsid
Ui;Sj
with non-negligible probability
of No   MatchingA;Ui(k), then we can construct a PPT
machine T which can win the Game of unforgeable against
chosen message attack (Game-UFCMA) [47] by employing
A.
In Game-UFCMA, there is a signature signing oracleQ
Sign. A challenger who has PK
0 can make signing queries
on messages, and can also verify the signature by using PK 0.
To win the game, the challenger needs to output a fresh
message Mnew with valid signature on it. Let Prwin[SIG]
be the probability of the advantage of game winning.
The basic idea is that to win Game-UFCMA, T simulates an
environment of our concrete protocol to convince adversary A
that this simulation is the real concrete protocol. In addition, A
should only have a negligible probability to know the truce, i.e.
this is not a real protocol environment but a simulation. In such
simulation, T communicates with A who has the ability to
successfully forge server’s signature in a session with session
ID sid with a non-negligible probability. Then, T will make
use of A’s ability to win Game-UFCMA with a non-negligible
probability.
To use A, T needs to simulate A’s view as follows. In
the simulation, T answers all oracle queries made by A. To
achieve this goal, T needs to setup all parameters except
signing key SK 0. In our concrete scheme, A can ask following
quires:
 Execute(Ui; Sj ; sid): In
Q
,
Qsid
Ui;Sj
and
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
generate
and record all messages transmitted between Ui and Sj ,
then send them to A.
 Send(Ui; Sj ; sid;M;m): A can send M1 to T , then T
responds M2 by asking the
Q
Sign of
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
. Upon
receiving M3 from A, T sends the result of user authen-
tication according to M1 and M3.
 Send(Sj ; Ui; sid;Mm0 ;m0): Upon receiving new session
query Send(Sj ;M; ), T asks
Qsid
Ui;Sj
to send first
message M1 to A. After receiving corresponding M2,
T checks the signature, and forms M3 if the signature is
valid.
If A can successfully pass server authentication with a
non-negligible probability, there must exist a matching con-
versation between A and T who simulates user Ui if the
following happens. In the simulation, first, T chooses message
M1 = (T; sid; g
a), and sends it to A. If A can success-
fully pass server authentication, then A will form message
M2 = (SID; sid; g
b; SigSK0(SID; T; sid; g
a; gb)) and send
it to T .
To win the Game-UFCMA with A’s help, T sends
M = (SID; T; sid; ga; gb) together with the signature in
M2 to the test query. We assume that A forges server S
and passes server authentication successfully in polynomial
time  , with non-negligible probability , asking qE times
to Execute(Ui; Sj ; sid) and qS times to send a query,
which contains qs times Send(Sj ; Ui; sid;Mm0 ;m0). Let 
be the probability of T winning Game-UFCMA when A
has failed to pass server authentication. The probability is
analysed as follows. In qs times send query made by A, we
choose one query to help us to answer the Game-UFCMA.
The probability of A pass sever authentication is , so the
probability of we win the Game-UFCMA is ( 1+(1 ) ).
Because that if A has passed authentication, then we have
100% probability to win the game. On the other side, A may
also failed with the probability of (1 ), in this case, we have
the probability of  to win the game. For the rest queries, the
probability of game wining without the help of A is . Thus,
Prwin[SIG] =
1
qs
 (  1 + (1  )  ) + qs   1
qs
 
=
+   (qs   )
qs
It is clear that Prwin[SIG] is non-negligible since  is
non-negligible and  is negligible. The time T spent to win
the games is  0 =  + 3, where t3 is the executing time
of T spends in GAME-UFCMA.  0 is a polynomial time
because both  and  03 are polynomial times. Therefore, we
can construct PPT machine T to win Game-UFCMA of the
signature scheme, with non-negligible probability, and this is
a contradiction.
Theorem 1: (Secure Three-Factor Mutual Authentication
(STMA)) In proposed protocol
Q
, if: (A) the PRF is
replaced by an ideal random function and PKE scheme
is secure against CCA2 attack; (B) the signature scheme
is unforgeable against chosen message attack; (C) at least
one of
Qsid
Ui;Sj
and
Qsid
Sj ;Ui
has accepted; then for any PPT
adversary A in the adversary model, the probabilities of
both No MatchingAUi (k) and No MatchingASj (k) are
negligible.
Proof: Obviously, the first condition of Definition 2 holds
because it is easy to verify that our concrete protocol is correct.
In addition, by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the second and third
conditions of Definition 2 also hold. Therefore, Theorem 1
holds.
Theorem 2: (Secure Three-Factor Authenticated Key Ex-
change (STAKE)) In proposed protocol
Q
, if (A) the PRF
is replaced by an ideal random function and the PKE scheme
is secure against CCA2 attack; (B) the signature scheme is
unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack; then for
any PPT adversary A in the adversary model, the advantage
AdvA(k) of A winning the game of AKEP in a fresh session
is negligible.
Proof: According to the Definition 3, STAKE needs
to meet three conditions. The first condition is that protocolQ
is required to satisfies STMA. This condition is achieved
because Theorem 1. The second condition is that for a fresh
session in protocol
Q
, if complete conversations are matched,
then the same session key must be shared between these two
communicating parties. This condition is achieved because
that in our concrete scheme, the key exchange is the plain
two-move Diffie-Hellman protocol [43], and this condition
is a well-known property and it was proved. For the third
condition, the advantage AdvA(k) = jPr[GguessA(k)]   1
2
j
is non-negligible due to [43]. Thus,
Q
is a secure three-factor
authenticated key exchange protocol.
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C. Privacy discussion
The proposed framework preserves user privacy due to
the following reasons. First, the server does not know any
information about the user’s biometric template since the
user does not need to provide biometric templates to the
server. Second, the data stored in SC will not leak biometric
information since V contains a large amount of noise. Thus,
the probability of successful recovering the biometric template
is negligible due to [35]. Moreover, the helper data H which
is required in the fingerprint based fuzzy vault scheme are
global features, and two very different fingerprint can have
very similar helper data. So, H also will not leak biometric
characteristics [35].
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed framework can systematically and efficiently
upgrade two-factor authentication schemes to three-factor
authentication schemes. The derived scheme protects user’s
privacy, and enhances security. In addition, we made a case
study by applying the framework on an existing two factor
authentication scheme [41]. Our analysis, discussion, and for-
mal proof show that the resulted three-factor protocol achieves
higher security guarantee and preserves user privacy.
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